Some brief thoughts about ethics.

One way to do moral philosophy is to start with your moral intuitions, figure out how they can be made internally consistent, make them internally consistent, and then proudly say you have an ethical system. Then you go around telling people that if they don’t agree with your ethical system, they’re objectively wrong, when they may be doing something similar to what you’re doing and have a different internally consistent ethical system. At that point, you can talk about counterintuitive statements that follow from the consistent ethical system (because all ethical systems are counterintuitive) and hope that the other person rejects their system because they can’t reconcile their moral intuitions.

This is particularly a problem for moral externalists. If someone has the intuition that morality doesn’t care about what you think, they can go around thinking things like, “You’re obligated to maximize world utility, even if you don’t want to!” (if the externalist is a utilitarian). The most common objections to utilitarianism attempt to provide specific cases where it leads to counterintuitive conclusions: harvesting one man’s organs to save five, sacrificing everything for a utility monster, etc. While those may be convincing to some, a convinced utilitarian could find some reason why harvesting one man’s organs wouldn’t increase world utility, or could bite the bullet and say we should sacrifice everything for the utility monster. A more effective reply would be to ask, “What obligates me to maximize world utility?” The utilitarian would say that morality obligates that, and it doesn’t matter what you think because that’s what it requires. But what makes this the thing that I should do? Where does the connection that binds me come from? Presumably the utilitarian believes in utilitarianism because of their moral intuitions, but what if I don’t share those intuitions? And what if those intuitions are wrong, as some intuitions about physics are? What the externalist is really saying is that according to the framework that follows from their moral intuitions, I should maximize world utility. But nothing binds me to this framework.

At this point, many people say that therefore there are no moral truths and there is no morality. That is stopping the investigation too early. What is a moral truth? Tautologically, it’s a truth about morality. What is morality? It’s what one should do. So a moral truth is a truth about what one should do. Are there truths about what one should do? There’s no external morality “out there” that binds us to certain shoulds, but that is not synonymous with saying that there are no truths about what one should do. Consider the statement, “If I want to eat, I should put food in my mouth”, and suppose that you want to eat. If the statement is true, then you should put food in your mouth. And here we have a (simplified) truth about what one should do - if you want to eat, you should put food in your mouth.

This is applicable in many other areas. If you can murder your neighbor and your neighbor can murder you, and both of you value your lives, you should agree not to murder each other. Someone who comes along and says “You shouldn’t make this agreement, even though you value your lives” is objectively wrong. If having friends makes me happy, and I’m capable of having them, then someone who comes along and says, “You shouldn’t have friends” is also objectively wrong. If you’re a paperclip maximizer and someone comes along and says that you shouldn’t maximize paperclips, they’re wrong (because nothing binds you to not maximizing paperclips).

This reduces “You should X” to “X follows from what you want”, and “You shouldn’t X” to “X doesn’t follow from what you want” or “X is contrary to what you want”. Because people aren’t always internally consistent, and their mistakes are sometimes predictable (such as if they’re because of widely held social norms), people can be mistaken about whether they should or shouldn’t do something, and in those cases we can say that they should do otherwise - not because it follows from our moral intuitions, but because it follows from what they want.

This means that morality (what one should do) is not mere opinion, because what an agent wants is not a matter of opinion, but a fact about the world. This does mean that morality is agent-relative - whether an act is right or wrong depends on the agent - but there is a non-relativistic framework for determining what the agent should do.

ordnungsokonomik:

can someone who knows how to use python help me

there’s an obvious error in this code but I’m too tired to see it:

name = input(‘Who are you? ‘)

if name = ‘Nick’:

    print(“Hello, Nick!”)

else:

    print(“I don’t know you…”)

There are two errors here. First,

if name = ‘Nick’:

should be

if name == ‘Nick’

Second, if you’re using input and you want Python to process it as a string, when it asks you for input, you should type in “Nick” (quotation marks included) rather than Nick (without quotation marks).

karmakaiser:

"Did you do the reading?"

"I start every lecture from behind the veil of ignorance"

karmakaiser:

rightnowbb:

You can’t have capitalism without ableism and classism. It’s not just that it’s not working out in practice; it’s a paradox on paper.

It really seems to me that capital markets, systems of entrepreneurship and experimentation is exactly what made *a lot* of the medical and prosthetic advances in the last 200 for disabled persons

I know of no other social order that has lifted more people out of starvation, made the lame walk and so on than globalized capitalism. The system has flaws no denying, but “the disabled being materially worse off than in other systems” is not among those flaws. 

michaelblume:

eccentric-opinion:

ozymandias271:

are bioethicists just universally terrible?

every time I hear of bioethicists saying something it is like “disabled people have a vastly lower quality of life than nondisabled people even though we did an empiricism and they actually don’t” or “we should not let people get money for kidneys and then make kidney donation really hard for no readily apparent reason” or “actually death is a GOOD thing” or “no assisted suicide for anyone ever” or “blah blah I hate transhumanism blah”

are there a bunch of reasonable bioethicists hanging around somewhere and I just don’t see them because no one bothers to argue with them? 

"As history shows, many bioethicists succumb to the thrill of exercising power by saying no. The bioethics field is littered with ill-advised bans, starting in the mid-1970s with the two year international moratorium on recombining DNA, and also including existing laws against selling organs and blood and President Clinton’s prohibition on using human embryos in federally funded medical research.

Simply leaving people free to make their own mistakes will get a bioethicist no perks, no conferences, and no power.”

- Ronald Bailey, Liberation Biology

Likewise, all that is necessary to defeat a bioethicist is to imagine his eyes glowing red and his voice deepening whenever he mentions death, decay, suffering, and necessity.”

- Black Belt Bayesian, Horned Gods and Dread Bioethicists

ozymandias271:

are bioethicists just universally terrible?

every time I hear of bioethicists saying something it is like “disabled people have a vastly lower quality of life than nondisabled people even though we did an empiricism and they actually don’t” or “we should not let people get money for kidneys and then make kidney donation really hard for no readily apparent reason” or “actually death is a GOOD thing” or “no assisted suicide for anyone ever” or “blah blah I hate transhumanism blah”

are there a bunch of reasonable bioethicists hanging around somewhere and I just don’t see them because no one bothers to argue with them? 

"As history shows, many bioethicists succumb to the thrill of exercising power by saying no. The bioethics field is littered with ill-advised bans, starting in the mid-1970s with the two year international moratorium on recombining DNA, and also including existing laws against selling organs and blood and President Clinton’s prohibition on using human embryos in federally funded medical research.

Simply leaving people free to make their own mistakes will get a bioethicist no perks, no conferences, and no power.”

- Ronald Bailey, Liberation Biology

"I am aware at one point of time Adolf Hitler was the most hated person on Earth for the genocide of the Jews. But my father added ‘Lu’ in between, naming me Adolf Lu Hitler, and that’s why I am different."

Adolf Lu Hitler Marak

jonnovstheinternet:

So I heard it’s Earth Day

image

(via rubegoldbergsaciddreams)

scientiststhesis:

eccentric-opinion:

If you define “morality” to refer to something that’s not objective, the word “morality” will refer to something not objective. This is not surprising. But I don’t see why you’d want to do that. The common usage of the word “right” is nebulous and it’s not productive to try to figure out what it really means, because different people mean different things by it, and even the same person may use it differently in different contexts. However, the usage of (political) “rights” as something like “the product of mutually agreed-upon self-restriction” falls under the broad umbrella of how the word is used in general.

Indeed. But just the fact that different people mean different things by it should start suggesting that the thing is, well, subject-dependent.

It could mean that. Or it could mean that different people refer to different things by the word “morality”. (For example, if I referred to carnivores that bark as “cats” and carnivores that meow as “dogs”, I wouldn’t necessarily have any different beliefs about cats or dogs than you would, I would only be using different labels for the same concepts.) Or it could mean that most people use the word very nebulously and don’t have anything like a concrete ethical system in mind when they talk about morality.

I could talk about what I refer to as “morality” without using that word, though it would be cumbersome to do so.

Also, “figure out what it really means”? What does that mean? Nothing really means anything, words are just levers in brains to invoke certain concepts.

Imagine that people talk about “zarbles”. The language would have expressions like “as striped as a zarble”, people would describe round objects as zarblish, people would describe black-and-white objects as zarblish, etc. But few would have anything concrete in mind when they’d say “zarble”. Then someone would come along and ask, “Is a zarble a zebra-patterned marble?”, and then the fog would clear from people’s heads and they’d realize that when they’re talking about things being zarblish, they’re saying they’re similar to a zebra-patterned marble.

That’s what “figure out what it really means” means. Unfortunately, a similar analysis of what people mean by “is moral” would not produce something concrete.

First, even if you don’t want your neighbor’s stuff, it would still be to your advantage to be a credible threat to your neighbor so he’d have a reason to make this agreement instead of plotting to murder you and steal your stuff. Second, the benefits of the agreement in my example are not only that you and your neighbor wouldn’t steal from or murder each other, but also that the two of you would be in a state where you could cooperate (rather than live in fear of each other), and that would be in your advantage even if you don’t want to steal your neighbor’s stuff. Third, this particular example is about a specific case, and the reasoning can be applied more generally. For example, suppose you and your neighbors drive cars, and cars produce pollution. In a pre-contract world, all of you would drive without being constrained by the amount of pollution you impose on others, and this would produce a certain amount of pollution. However, you and your neighbors could get together and agree to a certain amount of compensation for pollution produced, paid by a driver to the rest of the neighbors. This would mean that in return for you having to pay others for the pollution you impose on them, others would pay you for the pollution they impose on you - and people would pollute less in general, now that it wasn’t free. Making such an agreement would be to your and your neighbors’ advantage in this case.

Okay? I still don’t see the point you’re trying to make with this, could you enlighten me?

My point was that even if you don’t have the specific preferences of the person in my example, you have a reason to make the agreement I described.

Okay, so you’re arguing over the definition of “utilitarianism.” Alright, then. I do believe other people ought to want to maximise world expected utility. No one is obligated to do anything, obligating people to do stuff doesn’t maximise world utility. I wish everyone wanted to do so, and if they did that would probably maximise world utility - which is to say, one level down, that if everyone was moral then everyone would be moral, according to me.

Question: Do you think they ought to maximize world utility, or do you merely want them to? Do you think the two are separate?

To give what will hopefully work as an example, suppose an ethical egoist likes cheese, and wants someone to buy it for them. Nevertheless, they do not think that the other person ought to buy them cheese, they think the other person should buy cheese and use it as they see fit.

To put it more generally, “I want you to X” and “You ought to X” seem to be separate. The latter implies the former, but they aren’t synonymous.

As for obligation, saying that someone is obligated to do something means that they ought to do something regardless of whether they want to. Do you think people ought to maximize world utility even if they don’t want to?

So, what name do you give to a non-moral-realist who believes the correct moral course of action is maximising world utility, believes other people should maximise world utility, and doesn’t believe that this belief is about the territory?

Confused. :P

Seriously, though, a non-moral-realist who believes in a “correct moral course of action” is self-contradictory. If they’re a moral non-realist, they don’t believe that there’s a correct moral course of action (or that other people should maximize world utility), and if they believe that there’s a correct moral course of action, they’re not a non-realist.

With the contradictory parts removed -

moral non-realist who wants to maximize world utility - altruistic moral non-realist (no special term)

person who believes that the correct moral course of action is maximizing world utility and other people should maximize world utility - utilitarian

The thing about all this is that you’re not using the word “true” in the “usual way.” When you say “X is true” one would reason that X is a proposition about objective reality that can be tested against and about which evidence can be gathered.

Moral propositions do not have that property. If an utilitarian (in the way you defined an utilitarian) and a contractarian disagree about whether an ethical proposition is “true,” there is no experiment even in principle that could determine which one of them was right! There are just the opinions/preferences of the agents, but there is no evidence, there is no testing and falsifying, there is just what the agents have reasoned out as the most convincing arguments to them. But a thing whose “truth-condition” depends on the reasonableness of an argument to an agent could not possibly be regarded as an objective fact about the world!

It’s not a matter of defining words like your game with cats and electrons. If moral realism says that morality is a thing that exists in the territory, which can be true or false independently of an agent reasoning about it, then it has to show its work and point to the feature of the world that’s objectively a morality. A person who says “this is a cat” can point to one and describe exactly what propositions are true about cats that anyone else can test for and check. A person who says “this is morality” cannot do so.

On the contrary, people (ethical theorists) point to things in the territory and say “this is morality” all the time, as I did in my example. They may point to different things in the territory, just like people could point to different things and say “this is a cat”. People can talk about whether a system of morality is internally consistent, and appeal to moral intuitions (i.e. “Your theory implies THAT, do you really believe THAT?”, and then the philosopher has to clarify, bite the bullet, or give up the theory). However, it is possible to have several internally consistent and mutually exclusive ethical theories, and to have people who agree with each theory bite the necessary bullets about the counterintuitive parts. However, the discussion needn’t end at that point. The disagreeing philosophers can prod at the foundations of each theory, such as the nature of moral motivation, moral epistemology, etc.

To summarize my own position on this, which would be endorsed by some moral realists but not by others:

There are some things that follow from what we already want/like*, but those things are often not obvious, so people can be in error about what they are. Lost Purposes and Cached Thoughts abound, vocabulary confusions make reasoning more difficult, Blue-Green thinking inhibits thinking about certain ideas labeled as Evil Enemy Thoughts, etc. For these and other reasons, people may not always successfully follow the chain of logic from “I want X” through “X requires Y” and “Y requires Z” to either “I want Z” or “If X requires Z, I’ll do without”. They go ahead and say “X! But not Z! Saying that X requires Y or that Y requires Z is heartless and cruel!” People accumulate errors in their thinking, so a lot of what they endorse doesn’t follow from what they fundamentally want (i.e. the things they’d want if they were consistent).

Some of these errors are in the area commonly labeled as “morality”, such as whether people have rights (and if so, what rights and why), how one ought to act in certain situations, etc. There’s no external stone tablet that dictates how people should act, so the only source of shoulds is what follows from what they already want, i.e. if you want X, then you should want Y.

If it helps, I can rephrase my position in two different ways. If “morality” refers to things under the nebulous umbrella that covers certain acts/attitudes/etc, my position is “There are objective** (but situational and agent-relative***) truths about how one ought to act in the areas that are commonly said to be labeled ‘moral questions/situations/etc’.” If morality refers to what one ought to do, my position is “There are objective** (but situational and agent-relative***) things that one ought to do that follow from what is already motivating, or would be motivating in a state of internal consistency”.

Finally, because of the psychological unity of mankind (which ethical theorists often refer to as “human nature”), there are commonalities in what people’s internally consistent preferences are. This means that to these hypothetical imperatives of the form “If X, then Y” we can add certain “X” when we’re talking about humans, and can therefore say “Y”.

I don’t believe in stone tablets, but I’m still a moral realist.

* The things that already motivate us, or the things that would motivate us if we were internally consistent.

** In the sense that I’m using it, “objective” means something like “a fact about the world and not a matter of opinion, and which may be but is not necessarily something independent of minds”.

*** They are situational because your preferences may be different in different situations. In a simplified example, “I should get in my car” is true if and only if “I want want to drive somewhere” or “I want to get something out of my car”. Therefore, “I should get in my car” is situational (because it isn’t true if you don’t want anything from your car), but objective (because when you want something from your car, it follows that you should get into it, and if you don’t want anything from your car, you shouldn’t get into it, and that’s a fact about what follows from your preferences, which exist in the world). They are agent-relative for a similar reason: if you want to drive somewhere, you should get in the car, but if being in cars is intensely unpleasant for me, I shouldn’t get into a car even though I may want to drive somewhere.

(Source: raginrayguns)

shlevy:

eccentric-opinion:

A brief summary regarding free speech:

1. You have the right to express a view and not have the government (or anyone else) beat you up, rob you, or use other rights-violating actions on you to silence you.

2. Because you have no right to be employed or served anywhere and anyone has the right to refuse employment/service to you for any reason, people firing you or refusing to serve you because of things you say does not violate your right to free speech, because otherwise your right to free speech would conflict with freedom of association. If someone can refuse to hire you simply because they feel like it, they can also refuse to hire you because of things you say.

3. Even though it’s not a rights violation, firing or boycotting people for expressing controversial views is bad, because even though it doesn’t violate their right to free speech, it contributes to silencing them non-coercively. which is injurious to free discourse and truth-seeking. Don’t think “Everything will be fine when we silence the Bad People”. Even if the people you’d be silencing are more wrong than average, you can’t reliably distinguish between people who are wrong and people who are right but disagree with you. If Galileo had pressed the “My Views of Physics Are Forever Unquestionably Accepted” button to silence the Church, he would have also prevented modern physics. Also, punishing unpopular views by boycotts/firing contributes to the social acceptance of boycotts/firing as a punishment for unpopular views - and everyone has unpopular views about something.

tl;dr: Instead of saying “This is a violation of freedom of speech!”, say “Don’t be Authoritarian Galileo!”

How far does point 3 go? When is it OK to change how you associate with someone/some group based on their views?

If their views cause them to be unpleasant, you disassociate yourself based on the unpleasantness, and are doing it for yourself rather than to punish them.

For example, imagine you own a small bakery and have two employees, an African-American and a white supremacist. If the white supremacist talks at work in a way that makes the African-American, you, or your customers uncomfortable, that’s interfering with business and you would be entirely justified in firing him. On the other hand, if he acts basically indistinguishably from a non-racist while he’s at work, but you know he goes home and posts on Stormfront, firing him for that would go against Point 3.

Or consider if one of your friends becomes a racist. Nevertheless, he doesn’t start treating you any differently, and you never notice him treating anyone else in an unfair way. He doesn’t often make comments about how he hates [insert race here], but if asked, he will admit that he believes that people of [insert race here] are inferior, less intelligent, more violent, etc. Would you end the friendship? If the thought of your friend being a racist is by itself unpleasant to you - if upon seeing your friend, you can’t help but think “Ugh, racist” - then ending the friendship may be justified. On the other hand, if you disagree with your friend’s views but aren’t repulsed by him, you shouldn’t end your friendship just to punish racism.

Scott Alexander, on the question of whether racists can be pleasant people:

As a teenager, I met a genuine neo-Nazi online. He seemed to be a pretty nice guy, and though he was aware I was Jewish, he kindly clarified that he thought killing all the Jews was a bad idea and it was really only necessary to get rid of the leaders of the Zionist-Israeli conspiracy. Anyway, we talked on and off for a few years, and if I’d known him in real life I probably would have been happy to invite him over for dinner.

This makes me think that my intuition of “hate neo-Nazis” is mostly based upon the assumption that neo-Nazis are the sort of people I would hate anyway: that this political opinion is correlated with non-political traits like being violent, being ignorant, being rude, and so on. If there were no intolerance line, I could continue to dislike the violent ignorant neo-Nazis for their violent ignorance, I could continue to object to Nazism in the same detached bloodless way I currently object to Communism or libertarianism, and if there were otherwise-decent neo-Nazis I could hang out with them and invite them to dinner. It seems like a reasonable plan, although I don’t know how many otherwise-decent neo-Nazis there are.

A brief summary regarding free speech:

1. You have the right to express a view and not have the government (or anyone else) beat you up, rob you, or use other rights-violating actions on you to silence you.

2. Because you have no right to be employed or served anywhere and anyone has the right to refuse employment/service to you for any reason, people firing you or refusing to serve you because of things you say does not violate your right to free speech, because otherwise your right to free speech would conflict with freedom of association. If someone can refuse to hire you simply because they feel like it, they can also refuse to hire you because of things you say.

3. Even though it’s not a rights violation, firing or boycotting people for expressing controversial views is bad, because even though it doesn’t violate their right to free speech, it contributes to silencing them non-coercively. which is injurious to free discourse and truth-seeking. Don’t think “Everything will be fine when we silence the Bad People”. Even if the people you’d be silencing are more wrong than average, you can’t reliably distinguish between people who are wrong and people who are right but disagree with you. If Galileo had pressed the “My Views of Physics Are Forever Unquestionably Accepted” button to silence the Church, he would have also prevented modern physics. Also, punishing unpopular views by boycotts/firing contributes to the social acceptance of boycotts/firing as a punishment for unpopular views - and everyone has unpopular views about something.

tl;dr: Instead of saying “This is a violation of freedom of speech!”, say “Don’t be Authoritarian Galileo!”

"I can’t remember where I heard this, but someone once said that defending a position by citing free speech is sort of the ultimate concession; you’re saying that the most compelling thing you can say for your position is that it’s not literally illegal to express."

(via researchtobedone)

Hm, I don’t agree with this. The right way to fight censorship is not to defend each potentially-censored thing on a case-by-case basis, but to attack the very policy of censorship on the grounds that it violates free speech. Going for the bigger picture is the better strategy, and is not conceding the debate at all.

(via antichrist-owls)

Except people don’t usually cite free speech to fight censorship, they usually do it whenever there are bad consequences for having bigoted, hateful, or otherwise shitty opinions. As tumblr loves repeating, free speech means the government can’t stop you from saying shitty stuff, but in any debate that doesn’t involve the government shutting you up, even bringing free speech up is a sign that you don’t really have much more to use to defend it.

(^via scientiststhesis, and concurrently:)

Well, yes. I’m also upset by people’s willingness to cross the line from condemnation to censorship- but on the other hand, this seems targeted at when people try to defend a position by stating that people are free to express it, or when they’re defending an expression of a position from idle criticism as opposed to from censorship. 

not that people are good at making the distinction, but. hm.

(^via itsbenedict)

I agree that there are a lot of cases where people (incorrectly) claim that no one can criticise them because they have a right to free speech, but the first part of the tumblr meme scientiststhesis mentioned is enough to combat this: If someone is saying “I have a right to free speech so I can yell about the gays all I want!”, the response is “You do indeed have a right to say that, just as I have a right to ignore and block you for saying it. Isn’t having rights wonderful?”

But the quote is going farther than that. It’s saying that using free speech to defend a position, regardless of context, is always an automatic concession. Sorry, you lose. What, hear out your arguments? But you used the free speech defense, and everyone knows that’s only used by evil people whose opinions are so horrible that free speech is the only thing that keeps them legal!

It’s bingo-carding, is what it is. And it’s a completely unnecessary idea when we already have the “free speech is irrelevant here” response above.

If the person thinks free speech protects them from criticism: Say “no it doesn’t.” Adding “and the fact that you brought that up is proof that you are an Evil Person” is not only wrong (there are actually lots of ways to bring up free speech in defense of a position without implying that its legality is its most attractive feature, and lots of ways to use free speech to defend non-horrible ideas), it muddies the waters by attacking the person personally. Yeah, it feels good to get in some solid snark against the (the people you think are the) bad guys, but it doesn’t actually help anything.

And on a broader scale, if people keep responding to “I have the right to say this” with “HAHA, you used the free speech defense! That must mean your side is so awful that free speech is the only thing going for it!” then actual censorship becomes a hell of a lot easeir because you have an emotional weapon to use against people who CAN legitimately use the free speech defense.

(via antichrist-owls)

I agree with everything you said. And I’d also suggest you click the link with the origin of the quote, because the tumblr meme was exactly the point Randall was making, I believe :P

(via scientiststhesis)

Saying “it’s free speech” isn’t a defense of a position, it’s a defense of the right to say a position, which may be important, such as if you’re being coercively silenced. But if you’re not being coercively silenced, it’s misplaced. If someone uses it improperly, it doesn’t mean that the position has nothing going for it, but it does probably mean that the person who holds the position is either a bad arguer or holds the position for the wrong reasons.

I think a more complete defense of free speech (more complete than refraining from the “Hahaha, you’re using the free speech defense”) would be a commitment that even awful people with awful views have free speech, and the fact that they’re not silenced is a testament to our freedom.

(Source: researchtobedone, via scientiststhesis)

lampsandtoasters:

kapooyah:

bellabracha:

what even IS american culture

it’s just a big ball of different cultures with no set value 

i don’t get it

image

this might just be the most accurate discription of america ever

(Source: cockedtail, via cyborgbutterflies)

Tags: America

ozymandias271:

aboveauthority:

The idea that employers discriminate based on sex, gender, ethnicity, etc. and the idea that employers are motivated entirely by chances of monetary gain are mutually exclusive.

that’s not true

let’s say that Earthlings don’t want to have Martians wait their tables and will refuse to go to a restaurant that has Martian waiters. That means that a rational restaurant owner would discriminate against Martians. 

Or maybe most Earthlings don’t have Martian friends. Hiring a person in your social networks is often rational because they’re more of a known quantity. A rational employer might choose to hire people in their social networks and thus mostly hire Earthlings over equally qualified Martians because no one they know knows any Martians. 

Or maybe red Martians are traditionally the household priests and priests take a lot of time off or even quit their jobs to do religious rituals. Employers might know this and thus refuse to hire red Martians and pay them less when they do hire them. Since red Martians already earn less, it is rational to make them the priests of the household, perpetuating the cycle. This is true even if green Martians are totally willing to become priests and would pick up the priestly slack if the red Martians just earned enough that it was worth it! 

I mean maybe you are defining “discrimination” as “discrimination that is totally irrational from a monetary perspective” but that seems silly and makes your statement a tautology rather than a factual claim. (Also all three of my examples IMO have negative effects on Martians in general.) 

aboveauthority:

The idea that employers discriminate based on sex, gender, ethnicity, etc. and the idea that employers are motivated entirely by chances of monetary gain are mutually exclusive.