walpurgisnacht-nightly:
eccentric-opinion:
[snip]
There’s a difference between having the opinion that X is good for you and X actually being good for you. Suppose you have the opinion that exercise is bad for you - there’s a fact of the matter that’s independent of your opinions, and you could be right or wrong. Sometimes it may seem like part of your self-interest is determined by your opinions - for example, “cheese is good, therefore I should eat it”. But while “cheese is good” can be construed as an opinion, it can also mean “cheese produces a certain desirable state in me”, which is coextensive with but not determined by your opinion.
By coexistent I’m assuming you mean not a sole variable that it is dependent on right?
By coextensive, I meant something like that there’s a thing that’s good for you (and therefore you should try to get it), and also the way in which it’s good for you causes you to have the opinion that it’s good. Causally, it’s “cheese produces a desirable state in me” -> “I should seek out cheese” and “cheese produces a desirable state in me” -> “I have the opinion that cheese is good”, but not “I have the opinion that cheese is good” -> “I should seek out cheese”. If that makes sense.
(Source: ketzerei-heuchelei)
ogingat:
information-catalysis:
eccentric-opinion:
information-catalysis:
eccentric-opinion:
ketzerei-heuchelei:
What does moral realism being true mean?
I interpret it as “What properties do we ideally want a system of morality to satisfy?”
So to me if moral realism is false then we’re in a really bad shape in some sense, as it means morality cannot consistently be moral
Moral realism being true is the following three statements being true:
- Moral statements are truth-apt.
- Some moral statements are true.
- The truth of moral statements is not determined by opinion.
Wouldn’t ethical egoism have some trouble fulfilling #3?
No, because egoism holds that one should act in one’s self-interest, not do whatever one’s opinions say is right.
But couldn’t self-interest possibly depend on the opinion held by the person at that time?
I do not see how. Anyway, here “determined by opinion” is standing in for something else, like “mind-independent” or “objective”, I think.
The term “objective” is overloaded, so I avoid using it. “Mind-independent” is similarly ambiguous - by some definitions, all three of subjectivism, contractarianism, and utilitarianism (yes, I know I’m mixing ethics and metaethics) are mind-dependent, by others, only the first two, and by still others, only subjectivism.
In 3 I literally meant “opinions”, so it’s the rejections of statements like “I think X is good, therefore it’s good”.
information-catalysis:
eccentric-opinion:
information-catalysis:
eccentric-opinion:
ketzerei-heuchelei:
What does moral realism being true mean?
I interpret it as “What properties do we ideally want a system of morality to satisfy?”
So to me if moral realism is false then we’re in a really bad shape in some sense, as it means morality cannot consistently be moral
Moral realism being true is the following three statements being true:
- Moral statements are truth-apt.
- Some moral statements are true.
- The truth of moral statements is not determined by opinion.
Wouldn’t ethical egoism have some trouble fulfilling #3?
No, because egoism holds that one should act in one’s self-interest, not do whatever one’s opinions say is right.
But couldn’t self-interest possibly depend on the opinion held by the person at that time?
There’s a difference between having the opinion that X is good for you and X actually being good for you. Suppose you have the opinion that exercise is bad for you - there’s a fact of the matter that’s independent of your opinions, and you could be right or wrong. Sometimes it may seem like part of your self-interest is determined by your opinions - for example, “cheese is good, therefore I should eat it”. But while “cheese is good” can be construed as an opinion, it can also mean “cheese produces a certain desirable state in me”, which is coextensive with but not determined by your opinion.
information-catalysis:
eccentric-opinion:
ketzerei-heuchelei:
What does moral realism being true mean?
I interpret it as “What properties do we ideally want a system of morality to satisfy?”
So to me if moral realism is false then we’re in a really bad shape in some sense, as it means morality cannot consistently be moral
Moral realism being true is the following three statements being true:
- Moral statements are truth-apt.
- Some moral statements are true.
- The truth of moral statements is not determined by opinion.
Wouldn’t ethical egoism have some trouble fulfilling #3?
No, because egoism holds that one should act in one’s self-interest, not do whatever one’s opinions say is right.
"When a person tells you you hurt them, you don’t get to decide you didn’t."
—
Louis C.K. (via sexual-feelings)
It’s so nice that there’s no way anybody could possibly abuse this.
(via dataandphilosophy)
What’s even better is that there’s no way people could, even without intending to abuse it, intuitively move toward an emotional style of greater pain and injury in order to garner discursive power.
(via ogingat)
#…ngh #yes this #unfortunately true #why tumblr is bad for brains like mine#although i do still agree with the original message #but having hurt someone doesn’t impose an infinite obligation on you to fix it #nor does it necessarily mean that your actions were wrong #reverse all advice you hear etc etc
Steelman of “you say I hurt you, but I really didn’t”: “In the most literal sense, I hurt you, but saying ‘you hurt me’ also has the connotation that I’m obligated to make up for it, or at least to not do it again. There are many situations for which that’s true, but this isn’t one of them. You aren’t merely reporting your state but making a claim against me, and I’m denying it.” If accommodating the other person isn’t worth it to you, it would be more honest to say something like “I’m sorry I hurt you, but [whatever it is] is more important to me”, but because of the social norm of there being such a strong connection between being hurt and being owed something, you end up sounding like “I know that I did something wrong, and I’ll keep doing it! Muahaha!”, and it’s understandable that people want to avoid it, though that has the obvious pitfalls.
(Source: classically-incomplete, via wanderdaydream)
ketzerei-heuchelei:
What does moral realism being true mean?
I interpret it as “What properties do we ideally want a system of morality to satisfy?”
So to me if moral realism is false then we’re in a really bad shape in some sense, as it means morality cannot consistently be moral
Moral realism being true is the following three statements being true:
- Moral statements are truth-apt.
- Some moral statements are true.
- The truth of moral statements is not determined by opinion.
wirehead-wannabe:
queenshulamit:
[snip]
Hmmm, this may help. Also increased poly may help (high and middle strata people date more people, so there is more of them to “go around”) Although personally, the emptiness/worthlessness of not having a primary (or at least a partner I can pretend is my primary through a fuckton of denial) is very like the emptiness of being totally single, but I don’t know if other people get the same emptiness/worthlessness.
I wonder how much of incel pain is from not having a partner, how much is from not feeling desirable, and how much is from being stereotyped as innately creepy. I’m guessing the proportions vary between individuals.
Huh. I kind of had the opposite prediction: that the One Penis Policy would make life harder for incel men since a few high strata men end up dating lots of women. (Mostly looking at this in a heteronormative way, but I know even less about the dynamics of same-sex poly than I do straight poly.)
What does the One Penis Policy have to do with anything? In my experience, people who tend to have it are uncomfortable with polyamory, and either stop being poly or get rid of it as they become more comfortable.
(Source: ketzerei-heuchelei)
"The highwayman takes solely upon himself the responsibility, danger, and crime of his own act. He does not pretend that he has any rightful claim to your money, or that he intends to use it for your own benefit. He does not pretend to be anything but a robber. He has not acquired impudence enough to profess to be merely a “protector,” and that he takes men’s money against their will, merely to enable him to “protect” those infatuated travellers, who feel perfectly able to protect themselves, or do not appreciate his peculiar system of protection. He is too sensible a man to make such professions as these. Furthermore, having taken your money, he leaves you, as you wish him to do. He does not persist in following you on the road, against your will; assuming to be your rightful “sovereign,” on account of the “protection” he affords you. He does not keep “protecting” you, by commanding you to bow down and serve him; by requiring you to do this, and forbidding you to do that; by robbing you of more money as often as he finds it for his interest or pleasure to do so; and by branding you as a rebel, a traitor, and an enemy to your country, and shooting you down without mercy, if you dispute his authority, or resist his demands. He is too much of a gentleman to be guilty of such impostures, and insults, and villanies as these. In short, he does not, in addition to robbing you, attempt to make you either his dupe or his slave."
— Lysander Spooner, No Treason (via optimizingjen)
(Source: jenlog, via optimizingjen)
Things Tumblr is stereotypically into:
Things people on my dashboard are into:
- Philosophy of mathematics
- Logical positivism
- Metaethics
eccentric-opinion:
Slate Star Codex has become a victim of the Iron Law of Web Design.
plain-dealing-villain said: Which one is that?
“Every website redesign is a change for the worse”.
Slate Star Codex has become a victim of the Iron Law of Web Design.
